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It's Worth the Hassle Part I1: How Does the Baby Veronica
Case Impact Cases Involving Indian Children?
Prof Elizabeth Barker Brandt

I

Court issued its second-ever den July 2013, the U.S. Supreme
cision interpreting the Indian
Child Welfare Act' - Adoptive

Couple v. Baby Girl.2 The majority opinion was authored by Justice Alito, who was joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and
Breyer. Justices Thomas and Breyer
also each filed separate concurring
opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a
strongly worded dissenting opinion
and was joined by Justices Ginsberg
and Kagan. Justice Scalia joined in
part in the dissent. The decision in
this case is enigmatic as one might
guess from the unusual alignment
of the court with Justice Scalia joiningJustice Sotomayor's dissent. The
impact of the decision on family law
and child welfare practice in cases involving Indian children is not clear.
The Adoptive Couple Decision
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl involved an Indian child, Veronica,
from Oklahoma who was placed by
her biological mother through a private adoption agency with a couple
in South Carolina. When Veronica's
biological father, a member of the
Cherokee Tribe, was served notice
of the pending adoption, he sought
custody of Veronica. The South Carolina Family Court, relying on the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
denied the adoptive couple's adoption petition and awarded custody
to the Indian father. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The adoptive couple successfully
petitioned for certiorari with the
U.S. Supreme Court. The Court's
majority held that some provisions
of ICWA did not apply. Instead, the

The Court reasoned that there had never been a custodial relationship
of any kind between the father and child, and that, therefore,
there was no "continuing relationship"and the"continued custody"
provision of ICWA did not make sense.
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Court, focusing on three provisions
of the statute, concluded that ICWA
does not apply to the narrow circumstance where a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights, voluntarily initiates a private adoption
proceeding. The Court remanded
the case to South Carolina and ordered the child removed from her
father's custody and returned to the
adoptive couple.
First, the Court found that section 1912(f)3 - which bars termination of a parent's rights unless there
is a showing of serious damage to the
child from the parent's "continued
custody" - does not apply when the
parent never had physical or legal
custody of the child. Although Veronica's parents had been engaged to
be married, at the time she was born
they were no longer in a relationship. Her father was in the military
awaiting immediate deployment
to Afghanistan. Although he must
have known of the child's birth, he
did not contact Veronica's mother,
provide any support for medical care
for the mother or his child, and he
had had no contact with the child
during the first months after Veronica was born. Focusing on the
term "continued custody,' the Court
reasoned that there had never been

__~

a custodial relationship of any kind
between the father and child, and
that, therefore, there was no "continuing relationship" and the "continued custody" provision of ICWA
did not make sense.
Second, the Court found that section 1912(d) 4 - which bars termination of a parent's rights without a
showing that active efforts have been
made to prevent the "breakup of the
Indian family" does not apply when
the parent never had a relationship
with the child. The Court focused
on the term "breakup" in this section. As with section 1912(f), the
Court reasoned that the absence of
any kind of actual custodial relationship between the father and the
child meant that such a relationship
could not be "broken up" under the
normal understanding of that term.
Finally, the Majority found that
section 1915(a)' - which establishes
placement preferences for the adoption of Indian children - does not
bar non-Indians from adopting an
Indian child when no other eligible
candidates have sought to adopt
the child.' In Adoptive Couple, the
birth mother of the child arranged
an adoption through a private, outof-state agency. The Court rejected
the notion that in such a situation,
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Yet the father's rights had not
concern that the Indian child's parents might not be in a position to ad- been terminated. Although much
equately protect the child's interest controversy exists regarding the due
in maintaining familial connections process requirement for terminatwith the tribe or the tribe's interest ing the parental rights of an unwed
in protecting its children.
father, it remains clear that some ofIn Adoptive Couple, the Majority ficial action is required. The unwed
never considers the tribal role in the father may or may not be entitled to
Critique of the decision
private adoption proceeding. Rather participate in the process depending
in AdoptiveCouple
it focuses exclusively on the father's on his own conduct. But, without
The Court's decision in the Adop- lack of early custodial and financial consent, until a parental termination
tive Couple case has been the subject involvement with Veronica. The or adoption order is entered based
"continued custody" and "active efof intense scrutiny and its impact is
on a constitutional putative father
not yet completely clear. While on forts" requirements of ICWA were statute, or until grounds for parenits face, the Court's reasoning ap- interpreted as if the fathers' interest tal termination case are proved, the
pears to grapple with the situation in was the only interest being protect- father has, at minimum, inchoate
a practical, and common-sense way, ed by the Act, and without regard to legal custody rights. In the Adoptive
the Majority is actually somewhat the distinct interests of the Cherokee Couple case, the father was clearly
myopic and fails to grapple with the Tribe. As a result, the Court renders angry at the breakup of his relationentirety of the statute or with the the tribe's intervention rights mean- ship with Veronica's mother and his
larger family law context of the case. ingless and nullifies the importance attention was pulled away by the deFirst, the Court majority ignored of the intervention provisions of mands of his ensuing deployment.
the statutory interest of the Chero- ICWA in many private adoption His angry, informal communications
kee Tribe when interpreting the stat- cases.
Likewise, the Court makes as- with the mother simply cannot, by
ute. ICWA's jurisdiction provisions
sumptions about state family law themselves, serve as the basis for the
are the core provisions of the Act
that are not consistent with develop- termination of his parental rights.
protecting tribes from the continuments in the field. Most important- Beyond his informal communicaing outplacement of Indian chilly, it concludes that the father had tions, no official action terminating
dren.7 Pursuant to these provisions, "relinquished" his custodial
rights his parental rights was ever entered
a tribe has the right to intervene as a
and that he had "abandoned his except in the case in which he apparty in a child custody case involv- child" because of his failure to make peared and objected and which was
ing an Indian child who is a member
contact with the child or provide fi- appealed to the Supreme Court.
of or eligible to be a member of the nancial support during the mother's
Finally, the Court ignored the
tribe in question. Tribes also may try pregnancy or after Veronica's birth. provisions of ICWA that impose
to seek the transfer of such cases to The Court proceeds based on this substantial procedural requirements
tribal court and, in some situations, purported "relinquishment" as if the on the "voluntary termination of
may exercise exclusive jurisdiction father has absolutely no cognizable parental rights" In effect, the Court
over Indian child custody cases. A rights vis- -vis the child.
treated the father's inaction as akin
tribe's right of intervention is mandatory and the tribe may exercise the
right at any point in the proceeding.
This right of intervention was included in ICWA to not only protect
The Court majority ignored the statutory interest
the best interests of Indian children
of
the Cherokee Tribe when interpreting the statute.
by ensuring that state courts consider tribal cultural and social norms,
but also to enable tribes to ensure
compliance with ICWA to protect
their continued existence and integrity.' Thus a tribe's right to intervention under ICWA reflects Congress's
she or the agency should be required
to demonstrate that she had invited
and explored alternative adoptive
placements for the child that complied with the ICWA placement
preferences.
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to a voluntary termination of his
parental rights and did not require
compliance with the process requirements of ICWA. One of the primary
purposes of ICWA is to make the
voluntary placement of Indian children more difficult. The provisions
of the Act were a direct response to
evidence in the legislative record establishing that Indian parents had
often been subjected to threat, pressure and trickery to induce them to
"voluntarily" consent to the termination of their parental rights
Thus,
ICWA requires that voluntary consents to parental termination must
be "executed in writing and recorded
before a judge,' and that the judge
must certify that the "terms and consequences of the consent were fully
explained in detail and were fully
understood by the parent ...- 0

The facts of the father's "relinquishment" of his parental rights in
Adoptive Couple evoke images of the
exact practice ICWA was intended to
prevent. In addition to angry personal texts to his former fianc6, the
father was approached by a process
server in a shopping mall parking
lot just days before his deployment
to Afghanistan. Believing he was
relinquishing his custodial rights
to the child's mother, he accepted
service and signed a "relinquishment" document of some sort. Although he immediately had second
thoughts about signing, the process
server refused to allow the father to
review the papers or reconsider his
signature.
Application ofAdoptiveCouple
1. The existing Indian family
doctrine
A number of commentators
have speculated that the effect of
the Adoptive Couple decision is to
validate the "existing Indian family" exception to ICWA. This excep-

tion, crafted by state courts and not
based on the language of the statute,
holds that ICWA does not apply at
all when a child is not removed from
an existing Indian family. While the
U.S. Supreme Court has never directly considered this exception to
ICWA, it appears to have rejected the
exception in dicta in MississippiBand
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.1 The
Court did not reference this exception in Adoptive Couple.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in
strikingly similar circumstances to
those of Adoptive Couple, rejected the

While the U.S. Supreme Court has
never directly considered
this exception to ICWA,
it appears to have rejected
the exception in dicta in
Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.11

existing Indian family exception in
1993 in Indian Tribe v. Doe.12 In that
case, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a nonIndian mother attempted to place
her child in an adoptive placement
through a private adoption agency
without input from the Indian father. The Court stated that requiring an Indian child to first be part
of an Indian family before ICWA applies, "would allow the non-Indian

mother to circumvent application of
ICWA and the tribe's interest in the
child by making sure that the child is
kept away from the reservation and
out of contact with the father and
his family." It concluded that such a
result would "undermine the tribe's
interest in its Indian children, which
the Supreme Court recognized in
[Holyfield]:13
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Adoptive Couple does not
adopt the "existing Indian family"
doctrine. While the decision certainly appears to have limited the
scope of ICWA in certain private
adoption situations, it does not create a wholesale exception to the Act.
For example, under the reasoning in
Adoptive Couple, where the Indian
parent has had physical or legal custody of a child, or where the adoption is not voluntarily initiated by
a parent, ICWA still applies. Thus,
in the vast majority of ICWA cases,
which involve situations in which a
child is removed from parental custody through the child protection
system, ICWA applies and Adoptive
Couple does limit the statute.
Even though Adoptive Couple
does not embrace the existing Indian family doctrine, it is still cause for
great concern. In a concurring opinionJustice Breyer expressed concern
about the risk of the decision excluding too many "absentee Indian
fathers" He cited some examples of
situations in which the decision perhaps should not apply, such as a case
of a father who has visitation rights
or has paid "all of his child support
obligations;' a case where a father
"was deceived about the existence of
the child' or a situation involving a
"father who was prevented from supporting his child' " 4
2. Child protection cases
The most common cases governed by ICWA are child protection
The Advocate. October 2014
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cases. The language of the statute
itself makes clear that Congress was
focused on governmental removals
of Indian children from their families without regard for tribal family
and cultural norms. The Adoptive
Couple case will not likely change
child welfare practice in cases involving Indian children for several reasons.
First, these cases are clearly "removals" - the exact focus of ICWA.
Child welfare cases do not involve
situations in which a parent is seeking to make a voluntary placement
of her or his child.
Second, the Court's concern in
Adoptive Couple that ICWA would
unnecessarily delay safe and loving
placements for children is not directly implicated by child welfare
cases. The functions and purposes
of the child protection system overlap the goals and purposes of ICWA.
The function of the child protection
agency is to reunite a child with her
or his family whenever possible.
State law requires child welfare officials to make reasonable efforts to
secure reunification and only permits alternative placements upon
substantial showings that either reunification cannot occur or that it
would pose serious danger for the
child. Thus ICWA's requirement
of "active efforts" does not raise the
danger that Indian children will be
disadvantaged in finding a permanent and loving home.
Adoptive Couple's significance
for other Idaho Statutes
In recent amendments to the
adoption statute in the Idaho Code,
recognition of the federal mandate
of ICWA was added: "[i]f applicable,
nothing in this chapter shall modify the requirements of the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
1902 et seq'15 However, the adop36
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Adoptive Couple will likely serve to limit the application
of ICWA for non-custodial Indian fathers, at least in similar
circumstances - private adoption, absent father.

tion statute clearly serves to limit the
rights of unmarried fathers in proceedings to determine placement of
a child. Thus, while ICWA is specifically addressed in the Idaho Code,
the outcome in Adoptive Couple will
likely serve to limit the application
of ICWA for non-custodial Indian
fathers, at least in similar circumstances - private adoption, absent
father. In a voluntary, private adoption of a child, if the parental rights
of an unmarried Indian father who
has never had a custodial or familial
relationship with his child are properly terminated under the Idaho statute, it is likely that ICWA would not
apply.
One other Idaho statute, the
"Safe Haven" statute, 16 is in direct
conflict with ICWA in that it does
not require the birth mother to
identify herself or the child's father,
so there is no required inquiry into
whether the child is enrolled or enrollable in a federally recognized
tribe. 7 Should a child be delivered
by a mother to safe haven, it would
be possible that the child would be
placed without regard to status as
an Indian child. Placements under
the Safe Haven statute are not voluntary in the same sense as the private
adoption in Adoptive Couple. They
are, in fact, removals in which the
child is in the custody of the state
and a modified child protection pro-

ceeding is employed to secure the
permanent placement of the child.
For that reason, these cases are not
governed by the exception to ICWA
carved out by Adoptive Couple. To
the extent the Safe Haven statute is
inconsistent with ICWA, it is likely
pre-empted by federal law. Special
care should be taken to avoid placing an Indian child through a safe
haven proceeding.
It ISworth the hassle
Even in the wake of Adoptive
Couple, and the likely narrowing of
ICWA, the underlying reason for its
passage - to protect Indian families
and tribes from loss of their children
and their culture - remains as valid
today as it was in the 1970's. Each
change in the federal government's
approach to tribes, though well intentioned, had dramatic and lingering negative consequences to Indian
families. The ICWA was a way to finally help fill the gaps left by these
federal policies and it remains an
important tool for Indian people to
preserve their future - their children.
The Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 was a circumstance where good
words and good intentions were
transformed into written law and
where the actual federal policy had a

positive impact on Indian children.
Chief Joseph once said:
Good words do not last long
unless they amount to something. Words do not pay for
my dead people. They do not
pay for my country, now overrun by white men. They do not
protect my father's grave. They
do not pay for all my horses and
cattle. Good words will not
give me back my children...
It makes my heart sick when I
remember all the good words
and all the broken promises. 8
In 1978, the new federal policy of
protecting Indian children from being placed in non-Indian homes, and
ensuring that a cultural connection
between the child and his/her tribe
was considered by the courts became
just such a law - good words that
amounted to something. After years
of federal policies that diverged from
one extreme to another, ICWA was a
targeted, strategic, practical policy; it
has been protecting Indian children
for 36 years. While it may sometimes
be difficult to apply or enforce, it is
indeed worth the hassle.
ICWA continues to be a tool used
to address the placement of Indian
children removed from their families by state child welfare authorities. Compliance with ICWA has
given tribes a role in shaping the safe
placement of their children. Even
so, the problem of the removal of
large numbers of Indian children
from their tribes may remain a serious problem. In 2013, officials from
several tribes in South Dakota, sued
the state of South Dakota arguing
that it had systematically violated
ICWA. A background story by National Public Radio that lead to the
litigation indicated that 87% of the
Indian children in foster care in

South Dakota are placed with white
families.' 9 As this article is written,
the South Dakota litigation is ongoing. To the extent the allegations in
the case have even some merit, they
illustrate the continuing need for
the Act.
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